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WHY BENEDICT v. RATNER?
THOMAS C. GORDON, JR.*
The rule of Benedict v. Ratner' is discussed in some Virginia circles
as often as the weather; past efforts to effect changes in each have been
comparable. There is now reasonable prospect of abolishing the rule
through adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Virginia.
2 It
may be appropriate, therefore, to discuss the rule again; its abolition
might be an impelling reason for adopting the Code.
The rule of Benedict v. Ratner, taking its name from the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in that case,3 is substantially
this: If a person impresses a lien on his property as security for a debt
to another, and if the debtor reserves or is permitted to exercise
power or dominion over the property that is inconsistent with the
avowed purpose of the transfer-for example, if the debtor assigns
his accounts receivable to secure a debt, but collects the proceeds of
the accounts and commingles them with his own funds-the lien is
illusory and void. Such reservations of power are sometimes referred
to as "unfettered dominion" in the debtor-lienor.
The desire of lenders' counsel to avoid loss of clients' liens on per-
sonal property by virtue of the application of Benedict v. Ratner is
a major cause of long and complicated loan agreements. Under ac-
cepted practice, a loan agreement governing accounts receivable financ-
*Partner, McGuire, Woods, King, Gordon & Davis, Richmond, Virginia; Pres-
ident, Virginia State Bar Association. B.S. 1936, LL.B. 1938, University of Virginia.
286 U.S. 353 (1925).
1§ 9-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, infra note 2o, abrogates the rule of
Benedict v. Ratner. The Virginia Advisory Legislative Council was directed
by the 1962 Session of the General Assembly of Virginia to study the desirability
of adopting the Code, in whole or in part, and report to the Governor and
General Assembly by October 1, 1963. The VALC has made a favorable report
and the Code has been introduced at the 1964 Session of the General Assembly of
Virginia.
3Supra note i. At least to Virginia lawyers, the rule should be known as that
of Lang v. Lee, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 410 (1825), rather than Benedict v. Ratner, since
the rule was announced by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the Lang
case one hundred years before the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
the Benedict case. Nevertheless, the Virginia court has not received credit or dis-
credit for the rule, and it will be referred to in accordance with common par-
lance as that of Benedict v. Ratner. For a discussion of the origin and development
of the rule in Virginia, see Brasfield, Reservation of Dominion over Property Given
as Security, 49 Va. L. Rev. 192 (1963).
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ing (where notification to the account debtors is not contemplated)
contains provisions that: (i) require the borrower to deliver all re-
mittances to the lender, promptly and in kind-that is, deliver all
checks and cash received by the borrower in payment of the assigned
accounts without commingling the remittances with the borrower's
funds; (2) require the borrower to obtain the lender's consent to the
granting of credits or adjustments on assigned accounts, and require
the borrower to separate all returned goods covered by assigned ac-
counts from other goods on hand and to mark the returned goods as
being pledged to or held in trust for the lender, pending release in
consideration of an assignment of additional accounts or a payment
by the borrower; (3) require the borrower to mark his books of ac-
counts so as to reflect the assignment; and (4) give the lender the right
to hold the remittances as security for the loan or to apply them to
repayment of the loan, or provide for revolving credit (effected by the
lender's release of the proceeds of the accounts in his hands from time
to time upon the substitution of other accounts receivable).
It may be observed that these provisions of the loan agreement
as outlined in the preceding paragraph contemplate a higher de-
gree of dominion in the lender than has been required by the decis-
ions. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in one case ap-
plying Virginia law4 sustained the lien on accounts receivable despite
failure to deliver the proceeds in kind and despite the commingling
of proceeds with the borrower's funds. The court found that the bor-
rower's duty to apply all remittances to the curtailment of the note
at the end of each sixty day period was sufficient to avoid a holding
of unfettered dominion in the borrower, even though the borrower
had the use of the moneys collected during the interim. The advised
lender may be reluctant, however, to require only that degree of
dominion required by lenders who have prevailed in decisions in-
volving attack upon their liens under Benedict v. Ratner. Dominion
in the lender, or absence of undue dominion in the borrower, is a
factual determination; and risk is involved in relying upon a decision
that upheld the lien despite commingling of proceeds by 'the borrow-
er, or in attempting to extract the permissible minimum of dominion
'Parker v. Meyer, 37 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 19o).
'Parker v. Meyer, supra note 4 (holding that the lien was valid despite bor-
rower's retention of proceeds for 6o days), may be contrasted with the statement
of the same court in Manufacturers Fin. Co. v. Armstrong, 78 F.2d g89 (4 th Cir. 1935)
(control of proceeds by borrower for 6 days suggests unfettered dominion). The
contrast might be explained by the fact that Virginia law was applied in Parker
and North Carolina law in Armstrong. But the leniency of Parker has been
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from the decided cases. More impelling, perhaps, should be the desire
of creditors to avoid the necessity of litigation to establish the validity
of their liens, particularly since our jurisprudence has not advanced
to the point of permitting damages for mental anguish suffered during
the course of litigation.
Until the rule of Benedict v. Ratner is abrogated, borrowers should
be reconciled to agreeing that they will deliver remittances in kind,
that they will be subject to restrictions on their freedom to grant
credits or adjustments and to deal with returned goods, and that they
will mark books. The advised lender may accept no less, while ad-
mitting (if pressed) that the restriction on granting credits and the
requirements of segregating returned goods and book-marking are not
expressly required by Virginia statute or decision.
The lender has borne only one of two burdens when he provides
for the necessary dominion in the loan agreement. The right to exer-
cise dominion will not suffice, if the requisite dominion is in fact not
exercised.6 The exercise of dominion, "policing" of the loan, is the
more difficult of the two; and policing practices are probably less
standard among lenders than are loan agreement provisions. The
practices of the accounts receivable financing companies in New York,
as described by a company representative, are as follows:
"No. i [These companies] make at least monthly audits against
the books of their assignors.
"No. 2 [They] verify the accounts by making test checks of the
fact that the amounts are still outstanding, very much as ... the
department stores do, by making test checks.
"No. 3 [They] check the collections very carefully. By looking
at the borrower's periodic balance sheet-you see, we do ask for
financial statements-[they] can tell from the way a man's busi-
ness is operated, whether indeed he is converting the proceeds
of assigned accounts, and the minute they learn about that, they
will do no further business with him."
7
It appears, then, that these financing companies have been able
to chart the course to be followed, to assure requisite dominion over
questioned by other courts. See Irving Trust Co. v. Finance Serv. Co., 63 F.2d 694,
696 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 289 US. 763 (1934).
6"It does not follow, however, that an assignment of accounts is good and en-
forceable in the hands of the assignee because it is cast in a form recognized as
sufficient to convey title by statute or by the decisions of the courts; for the rights
of the parties are to be determined by what they actually do rather than by the
provisions of a contract which they disregard in giving effect to the transaction."
Mount v. Savings & Loan Corp., 192 F.2d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1951).
7New York Law Revision Commission, Communication and Study Relating to
Assignments of Accounts Receivable, Leg. Doc. No. 65(k), app. V, p. 285 (1945).
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the assigned receivables, and have substantially resolved their prob-
lems under the rule of Benedict v. Ratner.8 If a chart can be so simply
drawn, it may be asked why so many lenders fail to exercise the
requisite dominion; or fail to exercise the degree of dominion that
would discourage trustees in bankruptcy and others from litigating
the issue.9 One probable cause of this litigation is the failure of lend-
ers to carry out dominion rights and practices, as provided for in loan
agreements and established by management. Accounts receivable com-
panies may be expected to have adequate personnel and equipment to
carry out policing activities. This is often not true of other lenders
who customarily lend on an unsecured basis, or under security devices
that are unaffected by Benedict v. Ratner. The result is failure to
exercise the requisite dominion.
Liens may be imperiled not only through failure to carry out
policing activities, as has been suggested, but also because lenders
are unaware that the rule of Benedict v. Ratner may be applicable in
certain cases. Two examples will be given, involving factor's liens
and mortgage warehousing.
A lender or factor 10 may advance money secured by a continuing
"It may be noted that, in the description of the practices followed by the ac-
counts receivable financing companies in New York, no reference is made to prac-
tices with respect to returned goods and credits or adjustments, or to bookmarking.
The following comments of the New York Law Revision Commission, supra note
7, relate to the necessity of following those practices in New York:
"The 1943 amendment of section 45 [of the Personal Property Law of
New York] added a clause expressly stating that the exercise of dominion
over returned goods by the assignor of accounts receivable shall not inval-
idate the assignee's lien on other accounts, and that the assignor's conduct
in granting credits and adjustments on an assigned account shall not in-
validate the lien on the balance of such account, 'irrespective of whether
the assignee shall have consented, or acquiesced in, such acts of the
assignor.'" Id. at 161.
"It seems to be assumed that, apart from statutes, marking of the
books is not necessary to the assignment, or effective either in itself or to
make a transfer by specific assignment of named accounts more effective.
It has been urged, however, that as a practical matter such marking makes
it impossible for a subsequent assignee of the accounts marked to be a pur-
chaser without notice." Id. at 22-23.
"In Virginia alone, at least twenty-four cases involving the rule of Benedict
v. Ratner have reached the highest court. These are in addition to the many fed-
eral bankruptcy cases arising in Virginia. "Lawyers representing banks and
other major financial institutions on the frontiers of new forms of financing have
told the writer that their biggest single perennial problem is the rule of Benedict v.
Ratner." Kripke, The Modernization of Concepts Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 15 Bus. Law 645, 652 (1960).
"'The definition of a "factor" includes persons who finance a manufacturer in
his purchase manufacture and sale of goods. See Va. Code Ann. § 55-143 (Repl.
Vol. 1959).
1964]
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lien upon goods to be manufactured and also upon the accounts re-
ceivable and proceeds arising out of the sale of finished goods. The
factor may duly record notice of the factoring agreement and be con-
tent to look exclusively to the security of the unfinished goods, which
he deems ample to protect him in the event of insolvency. But if he
permits the borrower to commingle the proceeds of the accounts with
his general funds and use them for general business purposes, the
entire lien may be subject to attack. In decisions applying Benedict
v. Ratner to different factual situations, liens have been held invalid
as to all security where the lender's exercise of dominion was only
over part of the security." This prompts the question whether the
failure of the factor to exercise dominion over the accounts or pro-
ceeds would operate to vitiate the lien on the unfinished goods re-
maining in the borrower's possession. Apparently, this question re-
mains undecided in Virginia.1
2
Benedict v. Ratner may be applicable to "mortgage warehousing"
transactions. Many mortgage companies, having made loans evidenced
by mortgage notes, enter into agreements to sell the mortgage notes to
long-term investors. To obtain funds until the sale is effected, it is
a common practice for the mortgage company to enter into a "mort-
gage warehousing" transaction-that is, to obtain a temporary loan,
usually from a bank, evidenced by the mortgage company's note se-
cured by the mortgage notes. It is contemplated that, when the sale
to the long-term investor is later effected, the mortgage company will
pay off its promissory note and thereby obtain the bank's release of the
mortgage notes, for delivery to the long-term investor. If, in accordance
with common practice, the bank permits the mortgage company to
collect and retain the installments on the mortgage notes during the
interim, Benedict v. Ratner may be applicable. Since the pledge to
"See Brasfield, supra note g, at 195.
'-That the lien on the remaining unfinished goods may be invalid, unless a
statutes abrogates the Benedict v. Ratner rule as to tangible personalty, is indi-
cated in Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827 (ist Cir. 1951). In Roche the
lien on accounts receivable under a factoring agreement was held invalid because
the lender failed to perfect his lien by asserting dominion prior to four months
before the borrower's bankruptcy. The court upheld the lien upon the merchan-
dise remaining in stock, but specifically pointed to a New Hampshire statute
qualifying the Benedict v. Ratner rule so as to make it inapplicable to the lien on
the tangible personal property. Presumably, similar considerations are applicable
to tangible personal property under trust receipts. It should be remembered
that the rule adopted by the court in Benedict v. Ratner had already been rec-
ognized by state law as applying to liens on tangible personal property. Ratner
argued, without success, that the rule as to tangibles should not be extended so as
to make it applicable to intangibles. See Benedict v. Ratner, supra note i, at s62.
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the bank purports to cover all payments made on the notes, the bank
should be concerned about possible attack of its lien because it failed
to exercise the required dominion over the pledged mortgage notes.
Whether or not there is agreement on retaining the rule of Bene-
dict v. Ratner in force, there should at least be agreement that the
punishment exacted for failure to exercise the requisite dominion is
extremely severe. Even if a lender mends his ways and commences
the exercise of his dominion rights at some time after the loan is made,
his lien may be subject to avoidance as a preferential transfer if the
borrower's bankruptcy ensues within four months after the lender
begins to exercise dominion. Since the lien is perfected at a time sub-
sequent to the making of the loan, the lien secures an antecedent debt
and therefore may be avoidable as a preference. 13
With a view to determining whether the punishment fits the crime,
we should consider arguments in support of Benedict v. Ratner. One
supporting argument has been summarized as follows: "[T]he rule
of Benedict v. Ratner, requiring the assignee to maintain the integrity
of the collections made by the assignor is nothing but the manifesta-
tion of sound business practice, and ... any other rule would make for
a great deal of sloppiness in the procedures of handling assigned ac-
counts."' 4 The rule as announced by the court was not grounded,
however, upon the policy of forcing the lender to adopt practices
conceived to be in his interest. To support the rule on this basis is
to engage in legal paternalism.
If Benedict v. Ratner is not to be maintained in force so as to re-
quire a lender to adhere to wise business procedures, the question
remains whether the rule is necessary in the interest of other creditors.
If other creditors should urge the retention of the rule to prevent the
secrecy of the lien, a recording or public notice requirement should
be ie more direct and satisfactory answer.'5 Unsecured creditors
might urge the continuance of the rule on another ground: that it
tends to force the lender to apply the proceeds of assigned accounts to
the orderly liquidation of the loan so that subsequently acquired ac-
counts may be available to satisfy the claims of general creditors.
Whether general creditors would be so benefitted, however, is prob-
lematical. It may be preferable from their standpoint that the borrow-
'2 See, e.g., Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, supra note 12.
"'New York Law Revision Commission, supra note 7, at 257.
'There is no statutory recording or public notice requirement in Virginia for
assignments of accounts receivable except when such assignments involve a factor's
lien as required by Va. Code Ann. § 55-145 (Repl. Vol. 1959), or a trust receipt
transaction as required by Va. Code Ann. § 6-562 (1950).
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er apply the proceeds of the assigned accounts to the operating needs
of his business or to the purchase of unencumbered assets, instead of
using the proceeds to curtail the secured loan. Moreover, in the case
of revolving credit, where the proceeds of collected accounts are re-
leased from time to time upon the assignment of new accounts, the
accounts collected while the revolving credit is in force need not be
applied to the liquidation of the loan in order to avoid the impact
of Benedict v. Ratner. It may be suggested that the benefit of the rule
to unsecured creditors is in the nature of a windfall since, by a rule of
law, assets intended to benefit a secured creditor are made available to
unsecured creditors.
In short, it appears that Benedict v. Ratner stems from a common
law concept or postulate divorced from the considerations of sound
business practices, secrecy of liens, or the protection of unsecured
creditors. The lien in Ratner was held invalid because of the reserva-
tion of dominion inconsistent with the purported disposition of the
title and creation of the lien.16 Other decisions stemming from com-
mon law postulates have been changed or modified by statute in Vir-
ginia.17 To suggest that the legislature should change the Benedict
v. Ratner rule does not necessarily imply that the common law postu-
late was improperly applied in deciding the case.
Promptly after the decision in Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Klauder,'8 holding that the assignment of accounts receivable with-
out giving notice to the account debtors was incomplete and there-
fore avoidable as a preference by a trustee in bankruptcy, legislation
was enacted in Virginia that reversed Klauder and precluded attack
on the assignment on the ground of failure to notify.' 9 It is surprising
that the exposure of lenders under Benedict v. Ratner (more subtle
but no less devastating than Klauder) did not prompt them to seek
statutory change in Virginia long ago. In any event, change of the rule
apparently can be made most effectively by adoption of the Uniform
16"It [the rule] rests not upon seeming ownership because of possession re-
tained, but upon a lack of ownership because of dominion reserved. It does not
raise a presumption of fraud. It imputes fraud conclusively because of the reser-
vation of dominion inconsistent with the effective disposition of title and creation
of a lien." Benedict v. Ratner, supra note 1, at 361.
17For example, the postulate that a gift over, following a gift in fee simple, is
void for repugnancy has been made inapplicable to a gift over following a life estate
with full power of disposition in the life tenant. See Va. Code Ann. § 55-7 (Repl.
Vol. 1959), changing the rule of May v. Joynes, 61 Va. (2o Gratt.) 693 (1871).
83x8 U.S. 434 (1943).
"The Klauder decision was handed down in 1943 and in the following year,
Va. Code Ann. § 11-5 (Repl. Vol. 1956) was enacted into law.
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Commercial Code.2 0 As has been aptly said: "Several states have en-
acted statutory provisions making clear that Benedict v. Ratner does
not apply in limited contexts. But only the Code breaks through the
alleged inconsistency of concepts, abolishes the rule forthrightly in
broad application, and leaves to the creditor the responsibility, as a
matter of business prudence rather than as a matter of law, for policing
the preservation of his security."
21
For another reason-the desirability of uniformity among the
states-adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code should be prefer-
able to enactment of a special Virginia statute abrogating Benedict v.
Ratner. So long as Virginia lenders enter into secured loan transac-
tions that may be affected by the laws of other states-because, for ex-
ample, they do business with nonresidents-they cannot afford to ig-
nore the applicability of the rule of Benedict v. Ratner in other states,
even after it has been abrogated in Virginia. Twenty-eight states have
adopted the Code; they include the major commercial states of the
Union.22 By adopting the Code, Virginia would add its recommenda-
2OUniform Commercial Code § 9-205 provides:
"A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by
reason of liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part
of the collateral (including returned or repossessed goods) or to collect
or compromise accounts, contract rights or chattel paper, or to accept
the return of goods or make repossessions, or to use, commingle or dis-
pose of proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the secured party to re-
quire the debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral."
2lKripke, supra note 9, at 652-53.
2-rhese states have adopted the Code:
State Adoption Date Effective Date
Alaska 1962 December 31, 1962
Arkansas 1961 January 1, 1962
California 1963 January 1, 1965
Connecticut 1959 October 1, 1961
Georgia 1962 January 1, 1964
Illinois 1961 July 2, 1962
Indiana 1963 July 1, 1964
Kentucky 1958 July 1, 1960
Maine 1963 January 1, 1965
Maryland 1963 February i, 1964
Massachusetts 1957 October 1, 1958
Michigan 1962 January 1, 1964
Missouri 1963 July 1, 1965
Montana 1963 January 1, 1965
Nebraska 1963 March 1, 1965
New Hampshire 1959 July 1, 1961
New Jersey 1961 January 1, 1963
New Mexico 1961 January 1, 1962
New York 1962 September 3o, 1964
1964]
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tion to the states that have not yet acted. If and when the Code be-
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